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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                     
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In this bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy court granted a 
motion by the City of Philadelphia ("the City") to recover 
unsecured post-petition real estate taxes and water/sewer rents 
from the secured creditor, United Jersey Bank ("UJB"), pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. § 506(c).  The district court affirmed the order of 
the bankruptcy court.  Because the City did not demonstrate that 
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the taxes conferred a direct benefit to the creditor whose claim 
the property secures, we will reverse the order of the district 
court. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 C.S. Associates, d/b/a University Nursing and 
Rehabilitation Center, the debtor in this case, owned and 
operated a skilled care nursing home in Philadelphia.  UJB is the 
Indenture Trustee under a Trust Indenture agreement entered into 
with the Philadelphia Authority for Industrial Development 
("PAID") in order to finance the acquisition, construction and 
equipping of the nursing home facility.  C.S. Associates entered 
into an installment sale agreement with PAID on February 16, 
1983.  To provide the necessary funds with which to finance the 
acquisition, construction and completion of the facility, PAID 
authorized and issued bonds ("1983 Bonds") in the aggregate 
principal amount of $6,870,000.  The 1983 Bonds were issued under 
and are secured by the Indenture entered into by and between PAID 
and UJB as Indenture Trustee on February 16, 1983.  Pursuant to 
the terms of the Indenture, PAID assigned all of its rights, its 
title and its interest under the installment sale agreement and 
all monies payable thereunder to UJB as Indenture Trustee for the 
benefit of the holders of the 1983 Bonds. 
 To secure the repayment of the 1983 Bonds, C.S. 
Associates granted to PAID a first priority mortgage on the 
facility and real property constituting the site of the facility. 
There is currently due and owing from C.S. Associates to UJB as 
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Indenture Trustee the principal amount of $3,367,037.47 plus 
interest and fees, which amount is secured by the mortgage. Thus, 
UJB is a secured creditor of C.S Associates. 
 On August 15, 1988, C.S. Associates filed a voluntary 
petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Thereafter, C.S. Associates failed to provide adequate services 
to its patients and on October 28, 1988, the facility was closed 
by the Department of Health of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
C.S. Associates' unsecured creditors' committee presented a plan 
of reorganization which called for the sale of the facility; 
however, this effort failed because, prior to the confirmation of 
the plan, the facility was repeatedly and severely vandalized 
from late September through December, 1989.  On April 18, 1990, 
pursuant to a motion filed by the United States Trustee, the 
bankruptcy court ordered the debtor's case converted to a case 
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.  Thereafter, Mitchell W. 
Miller was appointed Chapter 7 Trustee for the debtor. 
 During the pendency of C.S. Associates' Chapter 7 
proceeding, the City of Philadelphia filed two proofs of claim 
for post-petition administrative real estate taxes and 
water/sewer rents, totalling $548,706.80, which had been assessed 
against the facility.  The City also filed a proof of claim for 
pre-petition real estate taxes and water/sewer rents, totalling 
$48,803.46, which under the applicable state law had properly 
become liens against the facility. 
 By order dated November 10, 1992, the bankruptcy court 
approved the sale of the facility for $2,416,000, free and clear 
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of all liens and encumbrances.  UJB thereafter filed an action 
with the bankruptcy court to predetermine the extent, validity, 
and respective priority of any and all liens on the facility and, 
accordingly, on the proceeds of the approved sale.  The City 
maintained that both its pre-petition and post-petition real 
estate taxes and water/sewer rents had priority over UJB's 
secured claim. 
 The bankruptcy court, in accordance with our holding in 
Equibank, N.A. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 80, 
84-85 (3d Cir. 1989), held that the City's pre-petition liens had 
priority over UJB's secured claim as to the sale proceeds. 
However, the bankruptcy court held that the City's post-petition 
real estate taxes and water/sewer rents did not have priority 
over UJB's secured claim as to the sale proceeds.  The bankruptcy 
court went on to suggest that the City might be able to recover 
its post-petition real estate taxes and water/sewer rents from 
the sale proceeds pursuant to either 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i) 
or 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). 
 Accordingly, on March 12, 1993, the City moved the 
bankruptcy court, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(c), to surcharge 
the sale proceeds and allow the City to recover its post-petition 
real estate tax claims and its water/sewer rent claims.  In the 
order of the bankruptcy court which is at issue in this appeal, 
the bankruptcy court granted the City's motion under § 506(c) to 
obtain compensation for post-petition real estate taxes and 
water/sewer rents in the stipulated amount of $548,706.80. 
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 UJB appealed the disputed bankruptcy court order to the 
district court, arguing that the City had not met the 
requirements of § 506(c) with respect to the post-petition real 
estate taxes and water/sewer rents.  The district court affirmed 
the bankruptcy court's order.  UJB took this appeal.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 UJB argues before us that the district court and 
bankruptcy court erred in holding that the City had met the 
requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) and could recover post-
petition real estate taxes and water/sewer rents under that 
section.  "Because the district court sits as an appellate court 
in bankruptcy cases, our review of the district court's decision 
is plenary.  This [c]ourt's standard of review is clearly 
erroneous as to findings of fact by the bankruptcy court, and 
plenary as to conclusions of law."  In re Stendardo, 991 F.2d 
1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).  The issue in this 
appeal is whether the bankruptcy court and district court 
correctly interpreted and applied the legal standard contained in 
§ 506(c), and we will therefore exercise plenary review.  See 
Maritime Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 F.2d 1194, 1203 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  
 In Equibank, we held that the automatic stay provision 
of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4), "prevents the 
creation of a lien post-petition."  884 F.2d at 84.  The only 
amounts in question in this appeal are post-petition real estate 
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taxes and water/sewer rents, and therefore the City's taxes and 
rents have not and cannot attain lien status for purposes of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  Id. at 84-85. 
The code . . . provides two options for payment of 
taxes that have not attained lien status as of the date 
of the entry of the stay.  First, they may be payable 
by the trustee, either as first priority administrative 
expenses, see 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(B)(i), or as 
seventh priority expenses, 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1). 
Second, they may be payable by the secured creditor as 
payment for benefit received, see 11 U.S.C. § 506(c). 
 
Equibank, 884 F.2d at 83.     
 The parties dispute whether the City could properly 
receive payment for the real estate taxes and water/sewer rents 
pursuant to the second option.  Section 506(c) of the Bankruptcy 
Code provides that:  "The trustee may recover from property 
securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs 
and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the 
extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim."  11 U.S.C. 
§506(c).  Our decisions have clarified that to recover expenses 
under § 506(c), a claimant must demonstrate that (1) the 
expenditures are reasonable and necessary to the preservation or 
disposal of the property and (2) the expenditures provide a 
direct benefit to the secured creditors.  Equibank, 884 F.2d at 
84, 86-87; In re McKeesport Steel Castings Co., 799 F.2d 91, 94-
95 (3d Cir. 1986); see also In re Glasply Marine Indus., 971 F.2d 
391, 394 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[T]o satisfy the benefits prong [of 
§506(c) the claimant] must establish in quantifiable terms that 
it expended funds directly to protect and preserve the 
collateral." (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re Flagstaff 
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Foodservice Corp., 762 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir. 1985) ("[T]o warrant 
[§] 506(c) recovery . . .  [the claimant] must show that . . . 
funds were expended primarily for the benefit of the creditor and 
that the creditor directly benefitted from the expenditure."). 
 In considering whether the post-petition real estate 
taxes and water/sewer rents assessed by the City qualified for 
treatment under § 506(c), the bankruptcy court stated: 
 The City's taxes and water and sewer rents are 
costs which necessarily accrued against the Property 
during the period that it was marketed for sale.  As a 
result of this marketing, the Property has been sold 
for an amount which will result in payment of certain 
net proceeds to UJB.  These facts alone establish that 
UJB was conferred with a benefit by the delays effected 
by the sale process, which also caused the taxes to 
accrue.  Hence, UJB received a direct benefit from the 
sale of the Property, which necessarily resulted in the 
accrual of these taxes and water and sewer rents while 
the Property was marketed, and is obliged to compensate 
the City for same out of the net sale proceeds payable 
to it. 
 
In re C.S. Assocs., No. 88-12842S, slip op. at 2 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
April 22, 1993); app. at 469. 
 On appeal from the order of the bankruptcy court, the 
district court held: 
[T]he fact of the accrual of the taxes over the period 
during which the property was marketed is not open to 
dispute, nor is the reasonableness of the amount of 
taxes as assessed pursuant to Pennsylvania statute. 
Further, the Bankruptcy Court's determination that the 
fact of the accrual of taxes while the marketing of the 
property took place was a benefit to the secured 
creditor represents a permissible inference for the 
court to have drawn and is supported by the record of 
the proceedings. 
 
United Jersey Bank v. Miller, No. 93-3065, slip op. at 5 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 9, 1993); app. at 544. 
9 
 As revealed by the language quoted above, the 
bankruptcy court and the district court operated under the 
assumption that the general and incidental benefits which an 
entity receives from municipal services are the type of benefits 
which § 506(c) contemplates.  We find that the bankruptcy court 
and the district court incorrectly interpreted and applied 
§506(c) in allowing recovery of the assessed taxes and rents 
without a demonstration by the City that such taxes and rents 
caused a direct benefit to UJB, the secured creditor. 
 Both the bankruptcy court and the district court 
mistakenly relied on our holding in Equibank, 884 F.2d 80, in 
reaching their conclusion.  In Equibank, we merely stated that 
real property taxes "may . . . arguably be payable as the secured 
creditor's liability pursuant to [§] 506(c)."  Id. at 86 
(emphasis added).  Because it was not clear to us what benefit 
the secured creditor derived from the payment of those taxes, we 
remanded the case so that the bankruptcy court could make a 
determination as to whether payment of the taxes provided a 
direct benefit to the secured creditor.  Id. at 86-87. 
 In this case, the City did not meet the requirement 
that it demonstrate a direct benefit to the secured creditor. 
Section 506(c) does not contemplate recovery for costs and/or 
expenses associated with the incidental benefits an entity may 
receive by virtue of existing within a municipality which 
provides general services funded by taxes.  This point has been 
cogently made by a district court: 
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Section 506(c) was not intended to encompass ordinary 
administrative expenses that are attributable to the 
general operation and dissolution of an estate in 
bankruptcy.  Rather, it was designed to extract from a 
particular asset the cost of preserving or disposing of 
that asset.  The trustee's payment of real property 
taxes might benefit . . . the . . . secured creditors 
to the extent that monies raised from the collection of 
property taxes are used, in part, to fund the local 
fire, police, and road maintenance departments, which 
provide protection to the secured property against 
vandalism and fire, and ensure that the adjoining road 
is kept in good condition.  This indirect benefit, 
however, is insufficient to bring these post-petition 
property taxes within the scope of § 506(c). 
 
 Courts have narrowly construed § 506(c) to 
encompass only those expenses that are specifically 
incurred for the express purpose of ensuring that the 
property is preserved and disposed of in a manner that 
provides the secured creditor with a maximum return on 
the debt and also apportions those costs to the secured 
creditor who, realistically, is assuming the asset. 
Although in exchange for the payment of property taxes, 
the estate would reap benefits that might aid in 
preserving the asset in the advent of fire or from the 
threat of vandalism, this incidental benefit is not 
what was contemplated by § 506(c).  Monies a government 
entity derives from the collection of real property 
taxes fund many governmental operations and services 
which are not directly related to preservation and 
disposal of the asset and in no way provide a benefit 
to the secured creditor.  Real estate tax revenues 
support public parks, libraries, schools, and social 
services, which do not constitute expenses peculiarly 
connected with preserving or disposing of the parcel of 
land. 
 
 Moreover, the Bankruptcy Code explicitly sets 
forth the level of priority to be afforded unsecured 
tax claims.  Section 503 . . . indicates that tax 
claims are generally afforded the status of ordinary 
administrative expenses, thereby receiving first 
priority after secured claims, unless they are the type 
of taxes specified in § 507(a)(7), in which case they 
will receive a seventh ranked priority after secured 
claims. 
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In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass'n, 92 B.R. 30, 35-36 (E.D.N.Y. 
1988) (citations omitted), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other 
grounds, 880 F.2d 1540 (2d Cir. 1989).  This reasoning is 
persuasive and we adopt it.  Accord In re Glasply, 971 F.2d at 
394 ("Even the small fraction of property taxes supplying fire 
protection fails the benefits prong [of § 506(c)] because it does 
not 'directly' protect and preserve the collateral.  The 
incidental benefits derived by [the secured creditor] from [the 
payment of] property taxes do not trigger section 506(c)." 
(citation omitted)).  Accordingly, the incidental benefits which 
the secured creditor received through general municipal services 
to the property do not justify recovery by the City under §506(c) 
for the post-petition real estate taxes and water/sewer rents 
which accrued as to the subject property. 
 The City argues that since the debtor retained no 
equity in the subject property, UJB as the secured creditor 
received the full benefit from the sale of the property.  The 
City argues that having the property on the market benefitted UJB 
because it was able to obtain the best available price for the 
property, and therefore real estate taxes and water/sewer rents 
which necessarily accrued during that time frame should be 
recoverable under § 506(c).  We reject this argument.  Simply 
because UJB benefitted from the sale of the property does not 
automatically mean that payment of real estate taxes and 
water/sewer rents which accrued pending the sale of the property 
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provided any direct benefit to the property in question.2  As 
stated above, incidental benefits which an entity receives from 
general municipal services are not the type of benefit 
contemplated by § 506(c). 
 Had the City put forth evidence that the property had 
received some direct or special governmental service which 
benefitted the property, our conclusion might be different.  For 
instance, if the City had stationed a police officer at the 
property to protect it, or if the fire department had provided 
some direct service at the location, such services might have 
been quantifiable and might have been recoverable under § 506(c). 
But in this case, the City, the bankruptcy court and the district 
court relied on the mere fact that government real estate taxes 
and water/sewer rents accrued as to the property during the post-
petition time frame.  This alone does not meet the requirement of 
§ 506(c) that a direct benefit to the secured creditor be 
demonstrated. 
 The City asserts that trash removal and road, water and 
sewer service benefitted the property.  However, the City 
apparently never presented proof in the bankruptcy court that any 
of these services actually were performed for the direct benefit 
of the property.  More importantly, even assuming that such 
services were performed for the benefit of the property, the City 
                                                           
2UJB contends vigorously that it will receive little benefit from 
the sale of the property, even if it is completed as approved by 
the bankruptcy court, since the net payment UJB will receive will 
still leave it, as a secured creditor, with a shortfall of 
$2,500,000. 
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did not quantify the value of services which were actually 
performed.  The City had the opportunity to present such proof in 
the bankruptcy court, but failed to do so.  The City therefore 
did not meet its burden under § 506(c). 
 We will reverse the judgment of the district court. The 
case will be remanded to the district court with a direction that 
it remand the case to the bankruptcy court with instructions to 
enter an order denying the motion of the City seeking payment 
under § 506(c) of post-petition real estate taxes and water/sewer 
rents from the proceeds of the sale of the subject property. 
_________________________________________ 
 
